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Abstract 
This paper uses a theoretical perspective based on the ideas of Foucault, critical criminology, 
and rural criminology, to examine how social relations influenced tax evasion mechanisms in 
agriculture in the province of Córdoba, Argentina. The paper’s main contribution is to show 
how tax evasion mechanisms are deeply rooted in social relationships developed in the grain 
market. Through the analysis of thirty interviews, official statistics of tax evasion convictions, 
and administrative resolutions issued by the national tax agency, I argue that severe formal 
controls were unsuccessful in eradicating tax evasion because normative changes could not 
abruptly annul the social relations that made tax evasion in agriculture possible. On the 
contrary, tax evasion persisted, although some evasion mechanisms were left aside and new 
ones were created. Thus, it is necessary to stress the importance of a paper that studies 
economic crimes in geographic areas outside the global north, such as rural Argentina. 
 
 
Keywords 
Tax evasion; agriculture; rural criminology; social control; criminal justice system; national 
tax agency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please cite this article as: 
Comba A (2019) Rural tax evasion in Argentina: An analysis of tax evasion mechanisms and social 
relationships in the Córdoba grain market. International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social 
Democracy 8(2): 68-82. DOI: 10.5204/ijcjsd.v8i2.1153. 
 
 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International 
Licence. As an open access journal, articles are free to use with proper attribution. ISSN: 2202-
8005  
Antonella Comba: Rural Tax Evasion in Argentina 
 
IJCJ&SD       69 
Online version via www.crimejusticejournal.com  © 2019 8(2) 
Introduction 
Tax evasion in agriculture involves the use of deceptive means to avoid paying taxes that levy 
each trading operation, in this case cereals and oilseeds. From a normative and legal perspective, 
transgressions have traditionally been addressed as crimes with negative and destructive 
consequences for the social order, conceived as a harmonious product of a social contract 
between equals. From another point of view, social sciences have considered normative 
transgressions to be social pathologies: for example, positivist criminologists have linked crime 
to psychological or biological pathologies and, on the other hand, in the Chicago School of 
Criminology, deviance was associated with social problems, including poverty and immigration, 
and social disorganization. In this paper, I set both of these paradigms aside and try to understand 
how social relations produce, reproduce, and legitimize normative transgressions by valuing 
what these transgressions “produce” in the Foucauldian sense (Foucault 1975). 
 
My investigation of agricultural tax evasion during the Postconvertibility era in the province of 
Córdoba,1 Argentina, during the Postconvertibility, focuses on social relationships developed in 
rural areas. Normative transgressions are produced by — at the same time they also reproduce 
— strong social bonds, which are further nurtured by mutual benefit, secrecy, debt or friendship 
(Dewey 2016; Pegoraro 2015; Van de Bunt 2014). With this in mind, I used a theoretical 
perspective based on the contributions of Foucault (1975), critical criminology, and rural 
criminology, to study how social relations enable the emergence and reproduction of agricultural 
tax evasion. To this end, I addressed the different types of formal control enforced in the grain 
market to punish tax evasion to better understand how formal controls influence and affect tax 
evasion mechanisms. I also explored the lack of punitive feelings and anxieties regarding tax 
evasion in agriculture and analyzed which sociocultural mechanisms socially immunize tax 
evasion. 
 
In this paper, I present some results from my sociological research on agricultural tax evasion as 
a sociocultural phenomenon. The main contribution of this paper to social studies on crime and 
punishment is the analysis of the connection between the different strategies and mechanisms 
used to evade taxes in the province of Córdoba and the social relationships of the Argentinean 
rural landscape. Furthermore, the tax policies of control and sanctions aiming to suppress tax 
evasion in the grain market enforced during the Postconvertibility era did not eliminate tax 
illegalities, an outlook that ignores the social relationships that enabled tax evasion. Tax evasion 
in the grain market was not eradicated by the national tax agency’s various restrictions and 
controls, but through social bonds, agricultural actors simply found new forms of expression 
evident in the transformation and creation of new tax evasion mechanisms. 
 
The Postconvertibility era emerged as a new pattern of accumulation following the Demember 
2001 political and economic crisis in Argentina (Shorr and Wainer 2014). By 2003, the country 
had begun to experience significant economic recovery and progressive social inclusion, with 
improved unemployment and poverty, and external debt relief. Because of the devaluation 
experienced in 2002 and high international prices, along with an increasing demand for 
agricultural commodities — as in the unique case of soy — income from the export of grains and 
oilseeds was crucial for economic recovery and the political projects of Presidents, Nestor 
Kirchner (2003–2007) and Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (2007–2015).2 
 
Nevertheless, tax evasion is not the only normative transgression in agriculture. In rural areas, 
tax evasion coexists with other normative transgressions including unregistered and forced 
labor, gender violence, and environmental crimes. However, since the export and 
industrialization of grains and oilseeds became a principal generator of foreign exchange income 
for Argentina (Barsky and Gelman 2001), the transgression that has gained the most social and 
political visibility is tax evasion, for both value-added and income tax.  
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Nonetheless, in my research, I found that even when tax evasion was heavily regulated, it was 
considered a legitimate phenomenon in everyday rural life in the province of Córdoba. Evidence 
of this appeared during interviews with different agricultural actors. For example, when I asked 
an intermediary in trading operations of cereals and oilseeds, which was the most common 
offense in agriculture, without any hesitation, he asserted that it was unregistered grains and 
oilseeds commercial agricultural operations. In short, tax evasion, or, as our interviewees call it, 
to buy and sell agricultural goods in “black”: 
 
Look, the most common thing around here is the sale of “black” soy, and also of 
cereals in general, not just soy.3 I mean, soy, corn, wheat, whatever...Obviously, I’m 
not saying everyone does it, okay? But here in a small town like ours, it exists. And 
I see it daily...But it is very common to sell “black”. Very common. Always, for any 
kind of producer, even the largest. It is a way of not declaring everything and … of 
not having to pay income tax and other taxes. 
 
A lawyer who specializes in taxes expressed the same idea: 
 
Q: And which is the most common transgression in agriculture? 
A: Well, “negrear”,4 obviously. It seems to me now that we have more tax pressure, 
it is not as easy as before, but everyone knows that the most obvious and common 
crime in agriculture is tax evasion. 
 
Despite the implementation of formal controls and sanctions in the grain market, tax evasion was 
not eliminated; tax illegalities did not disappear because of more intensive and extensive tax 
control policies. On the contrary, while some tax evasion mechanisms were curtailed, new ones 
emerged. In this paper, I examine the dynamism of ruptures and continuities in tax evasion 
mechanisms in rural Argentina, including the social relations that enabled them. 
 
A critical approach to the concept of formal control 
 
In his paradigmatic work, Visions of Social Control, Cohen (1985) presented social control as a 
problematic concept because it proposes a set of patterns of control enforced by a variety of 
professions on actors, who are classified as criminals, outsiders, or deviants. Likewise, the 
concept of formal control is complex. Though widely used, there is no strict definition as to which 
agencies and techniques of control are encompassed. Formal control can be broadly defined as 
the institutional punishments designed and applied by state agencies and security forces, 
intended to control the “problem of crime.” In this study, I employed a critical definition of social 
control informed by ideas from Foucault (1975), the labeling approach, and critical criminology, 
to highlight how formal control — rather than the elimination of tax offenses — alters the social 
fabric, in which tax infractions are daily produced and reproduced. Therefore formal control 
should be understood as a variable that structures and influences the mechanisms used to evade 
taxes in Argentinean agriculture. 
 
The labeling approach proposes a new way of considering social control, arguing that control 
generates deviance and not vice versa (Lemert 1967). Consequently, sociologists and 
criminologists who utilize the labeling approach highlight the political dimension of social 
control, affirming that the label “deviant” is applied to certain but not all normative 
transgressions. They emphasize how formal control is a productive force, through which 
lawmakers and law enforcement shape deviation. Following this point, notions about social 
control as merely reactive can be seriously considered. 
 
Critical criminology continues along the path paved by the labeling approach, although within 
Marxist premises and with a clear sociological orientation (Carrington and Hogg 2002). 
Selectivity in punishment is understood as being embedded in the heart of an unequal social 
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order. Critical criminologists argue that the focus should be on the processes of criminalization 
rooted in historically contextualized and specific punishment systems, rather than on abstract 
law. As a result, formal control becomes a tool of domination intimately linked to the state, 
politics, and economy, which is used to preserve the interest of groups in power. Despite their 
differences, both theoretical traditions allow us to assemble a critical affirmation: the 
enforcement of formal control is selective and does not solve the problem of crime. 
 
In Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, Foucault (1975) argues that formal control 
actually manages illegalities. Laws, the criminal justice system, and security agencies are not 
concerned with punishing every rule violation because they manage them. How? They punish 
some and tolerate others. In this way, formal control helps design an economy of illegalities, in 
which some are sanctioned and are seen as delinquent — transgressions typically related to low-
income sectors — while others are tolerated — illegalities generally associated with higher-
income sectors. If formal social control is not intended to solve the problem of crime, it should 
instead be seen as a productive force constantly affecting and structuring the universe of law-
breaking actions, converting some illegalities into delinquency while leaving others untouched 
by the criminal justice system and out of the public eye. 
 
In this paper, I focus on the use of formal control in the Argentinean grain market to try to 
eradicate tax evasion mechanisms, which are socially consolidated and strongly embedded in 
relationships developed through agricultural activity. The belief that formal controls and 
punishments are sufficient to extinguish agricultural tax evasion is akin to imagining that norms 
can override social relations, as if the law were to precede the social order. However, this does 
not imply that formal control is fruitless. On the contrary, formal control is productive — while it 
may curtail some evasion mechanisms, it also alters the social relations by which taxes are evaded 
on a daily basis and stimulates the creation of new mechanisms for tax evasion in agriculture. 
 
Economic crimes in rural criminology 
 
Multiple authors denounce unequal sanctions for different kinds of transgressions. For example, 
white collar crimes — “crimes of the powerful” (Ruggiero and Welch 2009) — usually remain 
unpunished by the criminal justice system and hidden from the public eye (Foucault 1975; Rusche 
and Kirchheimer 1984; Sutherland 1999; Veblen 2014). Although the study of these 
transgressions constitutes a topic of indisputable interest, economic crimes in rural areas 
remains an issue that requires further investigation. Over the past two decades, research on rural 
crime has flourished. Donnermeyer (2017) contends that rural criminology has emerged and 
established itself as a field of study within criminology. However, normative transgressions in 
rural areas have already been a topic of interest in mainstream or northern criminology 
(Carrington, Hogg and Sozzo 2015). Whether due to the common belief that the countryside is a 
place of order, safety, and low crime rates (Ceccato 2016; Donnermeyer 2016), or because of 
hegemonic criminology’s limited focus on the global north and almost exclusive concentration on 
metropolitan areas (Carrington et al. 2015), illegalities committed outside of urban spaces and in 
the global south have been underexamined. 
 
Nevertheless, investigations on rural crime have multiplied over the past decades and have 
expanded beyond Western Europe and the United States. A review of the issues addressed by 
rural criminology reveals a wide variety of studies in topics such as gender violence (Carrington 
et al. 2013), environmental crimes (White 2011), and drug use by adolescents. There remains 
much to explore regarding economic crime in rural areas, including money laundering and tax 
evasion. Although there are several studies addressing the issue of crime in agriculture — , like 
the theft of machinery, supplies, and livestock (Donnermeyer, Barclay and Mears 2011); the 
production of marijuana or methamphetamine (Barclay and Donnermeyer 2011); robberies of 
agricultural establishments, vandalism, and property theft among farmers (Barclay 2016); slave 
labor on farms through debt bondage (Barrick 2016); and drug use and interpersonal violence 
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(Carrington et al. 2013) — the crimes of the powerful in agriculture remain to be considered. 
There are some studies that investigate the illegal activities of businesses in rural areas, but they 
are carried out according to management theory (McElwee, Smith and Somerville 2011), rather 
than from a sociological point of view, which I intend to do, here. 
 
The aforementioned production is indispensable in rural criminology and criminology in general 
because it challenges the image of an idyllic countryside (Bell 2006) by revealing the voluminous 
existence of illegal activity in non-urban areas. By studying the crimes of agriculture’s most 
powerful in rural Argentina, located outside of the global north, this paper can make a significant 
theoretical and political contribution. 
 
Methodology 
 
For this study, I employed mixed methods — a prevalently qualitative methodology utilizing data 
from both primary and secondary sources. Regarding the first source of information, I conducted 
thirty interviews with social actors involved in the grain market, including: grain producers; grain 
and cereal transporters; owners of “soybean pools”;5 agronomists; cereal store owners; grain 
brokers;6 rural middlemen — “dateros”;7 lawyers and accountants employed by the criminal 
justice system and/or the national tax agency; police officers; and independent lawyers and 
accountants. Participants were recruited using the snowball method based on direct sampling. 
The first interviewees were initially contacted through personal networks that later allowed me 
access to the rest of the sample. For interviewees within the criminal justice system, I established 
a relationship with the clerks of entrance desks, who referred me to other lawyers until the 
network snowballed, reaching prosecutors and judges. In the case of the national tax agency, I 
went to one of the various buildings of this organization, took the elevator to the top of a 14-story 
building, and descended floor by floor, asking different people if I could interview them. After 
many rejections, I found someone willing to do an interview, who later recommend another 
colleague, and so on. 
 
The interviews were analyzed according to the guidelines of grounded theory (Glasser and 
Strauss 1967) and the coding process consisted of two parts. First, I identified approximately 
twenty common thematic axes that commonly appeared in the interviews. I created a double 
entry table, in which I would cut and paste fragments from the interviews into axes. There, I 
noticed how some axes could be merged or discarded, whereas others had acquired so much 
weight that they had to be subdivided. Second, I regrouped the data in thirteen thematic axes. The 
detailed recognition and analysis of these axes was fundamental to achieve concluding results 
based on qualitative material. 
 
The second source was the analysis of two data sets. I considered official statistics regarding 
criminal convictions for tax evasion during 2003–2015. Several limitations must be taken into 
consideration when analyzing official data on economic crimes and the criminal justice system. 
First, official statistics are constitutively skewed as they tend to register offenses reported to the 
police or punished by the criminal justice system. Normative transgressions that typically go 
unpunished — cybercrimes, state crimes, and economic crimes, including tax evasion — are 
rarely accounted for in official records. There are also constraints on official statistics regarding 
the daily functioning of the criminal justice system in Argentina since they are published 
irregularly and rarely available to the public (Olaeta and Comba 2016). I also studied the 
administrative resolutions and sanctions issued by the national tax agency8 2003–2015 intended 
to sanction agricultural tax evasion. To this end, I searched every norm issued during this period 
by the national tax agency regarding the control of the illegal grain market. 
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Findings 
 
The criminal justice system, national tax agency, and the “punishment” of tax evasion in 
agriculture 
Taking into consideration the wide array of problems regarding official records on economic 
crimes, there is still much to learn from official data. Following the ideas of Cicourel and Kitsuse 
(2012) in A note on the use of official statistics, if the selective functioning of the criminal justice 
system is later translated into official statistics, then official records can reveal with clarity which 
normative transgressions are prosecuted and punished by formal control agencies and, more 
importantly, those which are not. From this perspective, it is possible to recognize those 
transgressions that are tolerated (Foucault, 1975). With this in mind, I analyzed the official 
number of tax evasion convictions from 2013–2015 (see Table 1) in Argentina to determine 
whether this particular violation is a priority for the criminal justice system. 
 
Table 1. Criminal convictions for tax evasion in Argentina (2003–2015) 
 
Year Number of convictions for tax evasion (2003–2015) 
2003 22 
2004 34 
2005 34 
2006 19 
2007 34 
2008 29 
2009 12 
2010 14 
2011 10 
2012 6 
2013 1 
2014 4 
2015 4 
Total 223 
                         Elaboration based on data from the National Registry of Recidivism 
 
 
Over 13 years, there were 223 convictions for the crime of tax evasion in Argentina — a country 
with a population of approximately 44 million, distributed among 23 provinces and an 
autonomous capital city. Considering these numbers from a strictly normative and legal 
perspective — that each crime must receive a rational and proportional punishment according to 
the principle of proportionality — it could be expected that rates of conviction reflect the actual 
rate of tax evasion. For example, according to these statistics, the single conviction for the whole 
country in 2013 seems to indicate a non-existence of tax evaders in comparison to 2004, 2005, 
and 2007. However, if one analyzes these numbers with a critical perspective on social control 
(Melossi and Pavarini 2010; Pegoraro 2015; Rusche and Kirchheimer 1984), the conclusion is to 
the contrary as penal sanctions are oriented toward the punishment of petty theft, violent crimes, 
and low-scale drug trading, whereas a blind eye is turned to other harmful and complex 
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transgressions like tax evasion. In Argentina, this is reflected in the surveillance and punishment 
of undereducated young men from low socioeconomic sectors living in peripheral areas of the 
city. Hence, the criminal justice system does not aim to punish all illegal actions and all criminals. 
Instead, it functions by punishing some transgressions while tolerating others (Foucault 1975). 
Considering the 223 from the aforementioned critical guidelines, we can conclude that the same 
applies to the case of tax evasion in Argentina. In other words, even though tax evasion is a crime 
it remains legally unpunished. 
 
One of criminology’s major legacies has been Sutherland’s (1999) assertions regarding the 
selectivity of the criminal justice system and how certain transgressions like deceptive 
advertising, unfair competition, and fraud are usually settled according to civil rather than 
criminal procedures. If tax evasion in Argentina is rarely punished by criminal courts, agricultural 
tax offenses may be influenced by some other kind of formal regulations, shifting the research 
focus toward the national tax agency. During the Postconvertibility era, many of the major 
national newspapers published several articles with suggestive headlines about how the national 
tax agency was exercising an increasing and sometimes excessive control over the grain market. 
Nonetheless, the most forthright confirmation of a strong control policy from the national tax 
agency appeared in my interviews with social actors from the grain market. It became evident 
that the interviewees feared the administrative sanctions applied by the national tax agency more 
than criminal punishment. For example, a grain producer stated: 
 
Look, 30% of Argentina's grain economy is illegal ...We grain producers are tax 
evaders; we keep information to ourselves. We do not tell the truth, and there is 
no punishment because the tax penalty never gets to you, so you never go to jail. 
So it is the same whether to be “black” (that is, informal), or “white” (that is, with 
all the income fully declared), or blue or green. 
 
A grain broker similarly highlighted the widespread fear toward the national tax agency: 
 
At the moment, the grain business is much more controlled. That is good. Years ago 
it was a mess... You found more “negreros” (people who buy grains illegally) than 
people buying “white” (or legally)...But now it is well controlled...There are still 
some “negreros,” but much less...Now the national tax agency can withdraw you 
from the Registry, and if that happens, then it is the end for you. You have to be 
very, very careful. 
 
Consequently, I began to track and systematize all administrative resolutions issued by the 
national tax agency that aimed to create, modify and enforce procedures and regulations to 
further control and punish tax evasion in the production, transport and commerce of grains and 
cereals. I found that the national tax agency had issued 62 administrative resolutions to regulate 
tax evasion in the commerce of cereals and oilseeds, as shown in Figure 1. 
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Elaboration based on data from the Electronic Library of the National Tax Agency 
 
Figure 1. Administrative resolutions issued by the National Tax Agency in Argentina to control tax 
evasion in the grain market (2003–2015) 
 
Figure 1 demonstrates that from 2003–2015 there were multiple resolutions issued by the 
national tax agency designed to control and eliminate tax evasion in the grain market. Although 
in some years’ legislation was more prolific — like in 2007, 2009, and 2010 — whereas others 
saw little to no production of administrative resolutions — such as 2013, throughout the 
Postconvertibility era — the grain market was severely regulated by formal tax controls. So, 
although there was a mild criminal control of tax evasion — as evidenced in Table 1 — there were 
other types of formal controls enforced on tax evasion in agriculture by the national tax agency. 
 
However, the adminstrative resolutions issued by the national tax agency were exercised over 
socially and culturally established mechanisms of tax evasion. These mechanisms are deeply 
rooted in the social relationships developed in agriculture, as were observed in the province of 
Córdoba. Consequently, the agency wrongly assumed that formal controls such as penal sanctions 
and tax regulations could effectively suppress tax evasion because it did not account for the social 
relationships that facilitate normative transgressions of this type. Nevertheless, the regulatory 
policies applied to the grain market during the Postconvertibility era were not fruitless, which 
raised the question of which mechanisms of tax evasion were restricted and which were 
generated? 
 
Transformations in agricultural tax evasion mechanisms in the province of Córdoba 
In interviews with the social actors involved in the Córdoba grain market, every participant 
insisted that tax evasion in the grain market did not disappear despite intensive and extensive 
fiscal controls. Instead, grain producers, storage plants, and the companies that export and 
industrialize grains and oilseeds, continued to evade taxes through new tax evasion mechanisms. 
To reconstruct the continuities and discontinuities in tax evasion mechanisms during the 
Postconvertibility era, I operationalized these transformations along the agricultural value chain, 
separated into three periods: production, transport, and marketing of grains and cereals. 
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Production of grains and oilseeds 
One of the main transformations in Argentinean rurality was the emergence of “soybean pools” a 
new economic and productive actor that altered the agrarian social structure (Murmis 1998; 
Giarraca 2001) by converting low- and middle-scale grain producers into rentiers (Gras and 
Hernández 2009). As Barsky and Gelman (2001) argued, soybean pools surfaced as a new 
mechanism for financing and organizing agricultural exploitation during the soy boom9 
(Hernández 2007). Usually established under the legal figure of a financial trust for tax benefits, 
these pools had urban origins from city investors and financial speculation. This mechanism was 
novel, in that grain producers, contractors, and agronomists gathered around a pool and rented 
large extensions of land from several low-scale grain producers. Producers who once worked the 
land now rented their fields to larger financial agents, who then managed the production process. 
 
These transformations influenced tax evasion mechanisms. According to our interviewees, within 
the boom of soybean pools, taxes were evaded via the declaration of undervalued lease 
contracts10 to the national tax agency. During the soybean boom, gains were so high that rent was 
paid by the soybean pools in cash (sometimes in US dollars), even prior to cultivation and harvest. 
Due to collusion between the landowner — formerly a grain producer — and the tenant — the 
soybean pool — official rental contracts declared lower rental values than amounts actually paid. 
As a result, a portion of rent income was never declared. Through this misdeclaration, grain 
producers avoided paying the correct amount of income tax. One of the national tax agency’s main 
objectives was to regulate the grain market by motivating and then compelling grain producers 
to declare all income gained through commercial transactions or lease contracts so they could 
collect the appropriate income tax. Although the national tax agency did managed to have more 
taxpayers present their lease income, the landowners declared their leases with undervalued 
prices. One interviewee who works as an intermediary in commercial operations of grains and 
oilseeds affirmed: 
 
Yes, yes totally. It is not something concealed. In fact, for example, my father who 
is a rural “middleman”...tells me that all lease contracts of any given property have 
a “black” portion, which is requested by the landowner so that he does not have to 
declare it...And they actually tell you: “Give me the 60% of the rental price ‘white’ 
and the other 40% ‘black’”. That is the arrangement. So 40% comes in cash right 
there; they just put it right there on the table. That is the business. Then, you 
already have a 40% free of income tax. 
 
This raises the question, how is this operation carried out on a daily basis? In the words of a 
lawyer whose family has a long tradition in farming activities: 
 
So, what people do is they make an agreement. They agree on the payment of rent 
in cash equivalent to an amount of 6 quintals of soy per hectare, so they 
immediately say “okay, but let’s put it in writing that I will pay you 3 or 4 quintals 
of soy per hectare”...So, this other part is never declared. There is no receipt, there 
is nothing, and there is a sort of a “tacit” agreement that neither of them will break 
their word. 
 
As simple as seems, there is still room for disagreement among the participants. The same 
interviewee recalled: 
 
In the past, I also had situations in which two people started to discuss a lease 
contract and one of them... like pretends to declare everything and leave nothing 
“black”, and I saw how commercial operations were frustrated by this because the 
other part is not prepared or does not want to face the fact that when you declare 
everything, the cost is much higher and the profit is a bit scarcer…sometimes as a 
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lawyer they don’t even tell you this, but you see the contract and see the price to 
be paid as rent, and you already know that there is a “black” part being paid. In 
other words, it is not that they come and say, “Hey, we are going to evade taxes, 
here,” but you know that the value is rather low in regards to what is finally and 
actually being paid. 
 
However, several interviewees claimed that the soybean pool “fever” had diminished in recent 
years following the drop in the exorbitant prices of agricultural commodities, including soy. As a 
result, these extraordinary rent fees also began to decline and this particular method of tax 
evasion through undeclared rental income became obsolete. There have been similar 
transformations in tax evasion mechanisms in other parts of the agricultural chain, such as in the 
transport of grains and oilseeds. 
 
Transport of grains and oilseeds 
The transportation of grains and oilseeds from the fields where they are cultivated and harvested 
to the buyers is a crucial stage in the informal grain market. Why? Because the illegal sale of grains 
and cereals requires that they be circulated off the national tax agency’s records. Only through 
the informal transport of goods — outside of the scope of attention of the national tax agency — 
can subsequent illegal commercialization be secured. If the movement of grain is registered in 
any way, it becomes impossible to sell them as black. For this reason, the transport of agricultural 
goods became one of the national tax agency’s main concerns. 
 
Since most of the interviewees were located in southern Córdoba, the transport of grains and 
oilseeds to local storage plants or national ports could only be realized by land — road or rail. In 
this section, I describe the tax irregularities carried out via these means of transportation. n 
Argentina, only those with powerful networks and large volumes of production can use the 
railroads because they are a limited and highly monopolized service. Therefore, small and even 
medium grain producers are forced to utilize trucks. 
 
In order to control transport by land, the national tax agency implemented the Form for 
Transportation. This form verified a variety of details, including whether the weight of grains 
declared to the national tax agency was the same as the amount transported.   
 
Now, all of our interviewees remembered that prior to the introduction of more rigorous and 
intensive controls, circulation of cereals and oilseeds by land was done more freely. A local 
policeman recalled: 
 
Because that was very normal. And it was very normal at a time when trucks 
circulated without any kind Form for Transportation, unimpeded. They would go 
20, 30 kilometers, to a storage plant that was close by, and they didn’t use 
anything... Do you understand me? It was easy like that, there isn’t another story, 
it was simply like that. 
 
As one truck driver remembered: 
 
Years ago, I used to make “black” trips, which means that they did not exist 
anywhere...For example, out of a hundred trips in a year, it was common to make 
at least ten “black” trips. I must confess that back then, that caught my attention 
because I did not understand how it was done, how it was possible for us not to 
declare it... But that was back then. Later, you begin to figure it out. 
 
A major concern shared by interviewees was that in the event of any sort of tax irregularity, the 
national tax agency would not issue them these forms. Without this document, the producer was 
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severely limited and even unable to operate in commerce because no product could be formally 
transported. During the Postconvertibility era, the Form for Transportation was modified 
eighteen times to better regulate the transport of grains and oilseeds. Despite these controls and 
adjustments, illegal transport was not eradicated, but continued via other means. 
 
Following the implementation of this control, forgery of these forms became a new strategy of tax 
evasion and the avoidance of declaring the true amount of grains and cereals transported. In this 
way, tons of product “disappeared” from the formal registers of the national tax agency to later 
be illegally commercialized. A local policeman explained this process: 
 
Look, a truck can carry around thirty thousand kilos of product, and the driver has 
a Form for Transportation, but only twenty-five thousand kilos are registered and 
the remaining five is left unregistered...But, hey, don’t forget that there must be an 
arrangement between the driver and the person who is buying and selling “black” 
grains and cereals because the latter is the one giving him the illegal Form for 
Transportation. So, instead of carrying twenty-five thousand kilos the truck has 
thirty... and the other five do not appear anywhere. 
 
The same modality was explained by a cereal broker: 
 
Of course, the truck driver does it for a commission. Everyone is in on it, and 
everyone wins a little bit... what’s more, I know that even the truck driver has 
insurance that, in case he gets caught by the police, he has free legal advice already 
guaranteed by the company buying those “black” grains and cereals. So, they say, 
“if you get caught, don’t worry, rest assured that we will pay your lawyer.” 
 
Taxpayers feigned compliance with the new regulations — they officially registered and duly 
applied for the forms, but then used them in deceptive ways. Finally, I analyze the evolution of tax 
evasion mechanisms during the commercialization stage. 
 
Commercialization of grains and oilseeds 
Once grains and oilseeds are produced, harvested, and transported, they must be effectively sold 
and delivered to the buyer. As with the two previous stages, there are a series of mechanisms to 
avoid payment of the corresponding income tax and value-added tax. Our interviewers referred 
to this as “negrear,” which in rural slang means the act of selling and buying grains and oilseeds 
illegally. 
 
Before the implementation of more severe tax policies, participants recalled how the commerce 
of grains and cereals occur directly on the farm, in which grain producers received payments in 
cash without any kind of receipt or notification to the national tax agency. As a grain broker 
explained, this kind of operation was called “culata camión,” roughly translated as the act of 
buying and selling grains and cereals directly from the truck: 
 
There are the “valijeros”11, those who pay you in cash. There actually aren’t many 
left because of all of the national tax agency controls, but they are the ones who 
will pay you in cash. People call this “culata camión.” 
Q: I am sorry, what do they call it? 
A: “Culata camión”...So, it’s like this: they go to the farm, load the grains and 
oilseeds in the truck, weigh them, and just pay you right there in cash...That is 
“culata camión”...For that, they get a 14% discount, more or less the cost of buying 
“black” grains and cereals12...So, around ten days later, they pay you. But, 
sometimes they don’t, and how can you make any sort of claim if you don’t have a 
receipt or anything? Do you understand how this works? 
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This was typical before the Postconvertibility era. However, as has been demonstrated in the 
other stages, the multitude of regulations introduced by the national tax agency did not eliminate 
tax illegalities in the agricultural chain, but resulted in the creation of new tax evasion 
mechanisms. One such regulation required every natural or legal entity involved in the 
production, transport, export, and industrialization of grains and oilseeds, to register in the Tax 
Registry of Agents in the Grains and Dry Pulses Market,13 to legally buy or sell grains and oilseeds. 
To avoid paying taxes, agents created fake profiles in the Tax Registry. Big companies and major 
grain producers can could sell grains and cereals under the appearance of legality without 
arousing suspicions of foul play. In rural slang, this process is called “carpetas truchas” (fake 
profiles). According to a grain broker: 
 
Let me explain how it works when you try to sell “black” grains and oilseeds...So, 
you are a grain producer, you have soy, and you want to sell it “black”. I am a buyer 
on the black market...in order to do so, I have a “carpeta trucha” (or fake profile), 
whether in the form of a company or individual producer. Through this fake 
profile, I buy soy from you...But, beware, to the national tax agency it always seems 
like a “white” operation. The “black” part is when you sell it to me. That is why I 
have the fake profile and that is why I am going to charge you around 10% or 12%, 
because that is what I have to pay later to launder it. This is why I have a “carpeta 
trucha”. So, tomorrow, I assemble the portfolio of a company called “Johnny 
cereals”. With that fake company, I will buy your “black” grains and cereals from 
you, a producer, in order to sell them later to an important exporting company as 
“white” because I am “Johnny cereals”, and I am registered with the Tax Registry. 
Everything is okay because I have the fake profile...because according to the 
national tax agency, I’m supposedly a legal tax payer. I am “Johnny cereals”, do you 
understand? 
 
The “carpetas truchas” was a maneuver used both by agricultural producers to conceal their sales 
operations and by export companies that created shell companies or limited liability companies 
to fragment their marketing operations and pay less taxes. In exchange for money or promises of 
early retirement, people in vulnerable situations agreed to register in the Tax Registry as grain 
producers, brokers, or exporters, and these profiles were later turned into screens to conceal 
illegal commerce. As a result, the final beneficiaries of these operations remain hidden. One 
prosecutor explained: 
 
There is a case of a well-known lawyer in our hometown who used extremely poor 
people and later created bank accounts for them…Basically, these third parties 
were used to create shell companies, and through these atomized companies, large 
companies would fragment large commerce operations, thus preventing a single 
producer or company from having to pay the right tax burden. 
 
Even though the national tax agency succeeded in ensuring the registration of everyone 
participating in the grain market with the national tax agency, much of the paperwork presented 
was false — like balance sheets or rural property titles — and producers and export companies 
could conceal illegal commerce operations. 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper, I analyzed formal control and tax evasion in Argentinean agricultural activity during 
the Postconvertibility era from a sociological perspective and a critical vision of social control. 
The main purpose of this paper was to demonstrate how tax evasion is a complex sociocultural 
phenomenon and how different tax evasion mechanisms and modes are deeply rooted in the 
social relationships of the Argentinean rural landscape to contribute to research on economic 
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crimes in rural criminology. To this end, I reconstructed the transformations in tax evasion 
mechanisms in rural Córdoba. The purpose of studying the regulations and sanctions enforced by 
state agencies was not to evaluate their effectiveness in suppressing tax evasion, but to recognize 
how tax evasion mechanisms were affected. According to the contributions of critical criminology 
and Foucault, I analyzed what formal control produces can be observed — for example, in the 
creation of new tax evasion mechanisms. 
 
First, I argued that tax evasion in agriculture is a complex social phenomenon that is structured 
by multiple relations among heterogeneous social actors of the grain market. Moreover, I 
analyzed how various social relationships that structure the production, transport, and 
commerce of grains and oilseeds are the ones that enable the different tax evasion mechanisms. 
However, the main contribution of this paper was to examine how formal social control 
implemented in the grain market — despite restricting some tax evasion mechanisms — 
stimulated the creation of new ones. Tax evasion is deeply rooted in social relationships and will 
not disappear because more controls and sanctions are issued. This was evidenced by the 
transformations in tax evasion in the moment of production —with the declaration of 
undervalued lease contracts — in the moment of transport of grains and cereals — using forged 
Forms for Transport — and in the moment of commercialization — via the creation of fake profiles 
in the Tax Registry of Agents in the Grains and Dry Pulses Market. This evidence suggests that 
controls and formal sanctions do not simply repress illegalities, but are a force that affects and 
restructures tax evasion in agriculture and its mechanisms. Finally, this paper demonstrated that 
there remains much to investigate and learn about agricultural economic crimes, which may 
serve to stimulate further research. 
 
Correspondence: Dr Antonella Comba, Professor in Criminology, The Gino Germani Research 
Institute, University of Buenos Aires – UBA, Pres. José Evaristo Uriburu 950, C1114 AAD, Buenos 
Aires, Argentina. Email: antocomba@gmail.com. 
 
1 Córdoba is a province in the geographic center of Argentina. My investigation focuses on the southern area of the 
province known as the “soy corridor”. In this region, a massive agriculturalization process occurred in which the 
majority of the plantations were converted into soy.  
2 The political party that governed 2003–2015 was called the “Frente para la Victoria.” 
3 The rural scenario in Córdoba was deeply affected by the logic of the agribusiness model, which consisted of large-
scale production — in this case oriented by the monoculture of soy — the prevalence of large exploitation units, and 
export and industrialization companies. All of these factors radically altered the productive relationships that had 
historically developed in Córdoba, in which livestock production was gradually left aside for crop cultivation. 
4 Spanish term commonly found in rural slang that refers to illegal commerce. 
5 These pools function as a source of financing large-scale planting and harvesting enterprises by leasing of field 
extensions under the direction of college-educated professionals who utilize high-tech tools (Gras and Hernández 
2009). 
6 A grain broker is a person who connects those who want to sell or buy grains legally. 
7 Spanish term used in rural slang to name locals in small towns who have information on who desires to sell or buy 
grains and cereals informally. 
8The national tax agency is an autonomous agency in charge of the application, collection, and control of national 
income and taxes. 
9 This “boom” lasted from 2005 until 2014, when the price of some commodities, like soy, began to plummet. From then 
on, “soybean pools” began to disappear as they did not represent a profitable means for exploitation. 
10 A rental contract transfers the exploitation of land to a third party, as in the case of a “soybean pool”. Lease contracts 
regulate the price of rent, among other things. The value of rent is established yearly according to the size of the 
property, per hectare — a unit of area that equals to a 10,000 square meters — and varies according to the 
productivity per exploited hectare. 
11 In rural slang “valijero” is used to refer to people who buy grains and cereals illegally. The name comes from how 
these buyers used to carry suitcases (or “valijas” in Spanish) filled with cash so they could pay grains producers 
directly on the farm. 
12 The 14 percent discount is what a “valijero” charges for buying “black” goods in order to cover costs incurred to later 
launder those grains and oilseeds, which requires the payment of bribes and other expenses. 
13 This registry is a national tax database. 
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